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ARGUMENT 
Ray's position in this case is simple: The trial court erred when it determined 
there were no questions of material fact existing in this matter and that appellees were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. This Court reviews summary judgment 
for correctness affording no deference to the trial court. Ford v. American Express Fin. 
Advisors, 2004 UT 70, ^[21, 985 P.3d 15 (Utah Ct App. 2004). Ray contends there were 
sufficient questions of fact that should have precluded summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
In essence, the trial court determined that Ray did not have standing to assert his 
parentage action solely because the minor child was born into an intact marriage. At the 
very least, however, there were questions of fact before the trial court relating to Ray's 
care, comfort and support of the minor child as well as the nature and extent of the 
appellees' approval of the relationship between Ray and the young girl.1 Moreover, Ray 
contests the legal analysis the trial court employed when the court decided this case 
solely on the "intact marriage" factor. 
At bottom, as a result of Ray's appeal, this Court will have the opportunity to 
decide whether the sole fact that a child is born to mother who is married will by itself 
preclude any other person (with the exception of the mother's husband) standing to assert 
1
 Appellees argue that appellant failed to "marshal the evidence" and appropriately cite to 
the record in certain areas of Appellant's Brief. The Statement Of Facts section of 
Appellant's Brief, however, does cite the record. The factual arguments made by 
Appellant directly flow from the properly cited facts contained in the Statement Of Facts. 
1 
a parentage action. If so, under the facts of this case, Ray loses the opportunity to have a 
relationship with a child who is likely his biological daughter. Consequently, the mother 
(but not the biological father) will be provided protection under the law concerning 
parenting of the child even though she engaged in the same conduct as the biological 
father in bringing a child into the world. Such a result, based solely on one factor ( 
mother's marriage), is unconscionable and fundamentally wrong. 
The Court will also have the opportunity to interpret the interaction between the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act ("UUP A"), and specifically the meaning 
of UCA §78-45g-607. While the Utah legislature in substantial part adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act, §78-45g-607 is very different from the parallel section contained in the 
model act. The Uniform Parentage Act allows a certain period of time for a broad range 
of individuals to initiate a parentage proceeding. In comparison, § 78-45g-607(l), 
indicates, "paternity ... may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time 
prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the 
parents." While the legislature originally considering enacting § 78-45g-607 with the 
language, "paternity ... may only be raised by the presumed father...," the word "only" 
was stricken from the final enactment, (emphasis added.) 
If §78-45g-607 is construed in accordance with the trial court's interpretation, then 
when a child is born with a presumed father, only two individuals have standing to assert 
a paternity action: the presumed father and the mother. This reading not only excludes a 
2
 Even the child's mother has admitted in two notarized statements that Ray is the child's 
biological father. 
2 
biological father, but also would exclude the child, the state, or any other interested 
individual from initiating a parentage action. Such a reading is inconsistent with Utah 
case law and policy. 
The Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, 134 P.3d 173, (Utah Ct. App. 2006) 
case, cited by both parties herein, states that the biological father in that case had standing 
to assert parentage at the time the minor child was bom, but that he later lost that standing 
due to his actions and failure to be a part of his child's life. This instant case presents a 
very different situation. In this matter, Ray has continually and consistently sought to be 
part of the minor child's life. For a large period of time, Gregg and Corina were 
supportive of this relationship. In fact, Corina sought child support and a visitation 
arrangement in her initial filings with the trial court based upon the fact that Ray is the 
child's biological father. Pursuant to Utah law, "An admission of fact in a pleading is a 
judicial admission and is normally conclusive on the party making it." Baldwin v. 
Vantage Corporation^ 676 P.2d 413 (Utah 1984). Corina has consistently admitted Ray 
is the minor's father. Such an admission of fact should be considered a judicial 
admission. Based upon Corina's and Gregg's action, the trial court should have 
determined appellees were estopped from contesting Ray's standing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and legal argument, and the information contained 
in Appellant's Reply Brief, appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling and remand this case for further proceedings. 
3 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ 0 day of February, 2007. 
Brett^6. Cragun 
Attorney For Petitioner/App^iant 
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